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THE LEVELING of MEANING: 
CHRISTIAN ETHICS in A CULTURE 
OF UNCONCERN 
Philip Rossi, SJ 
Christian practices and beliefs - and, quite probably, the practices and beliefs of most religious traditions - have generally presupposed a 
deeply rooted human need to have one's own life and the context of one's 
life make sense in a definitive way. If one accords this quest to find a "final 
meaning" for human activity a fundamental status in the make-up of 
human beings, religion functions as an important activity for the 
satisfaction of this basic human need. Indeed, religion may even be 
understood to be nothing other than human engagement in such a quest 
for final meaning. I According to this view, meaninglessness, and its 
concomitant, despair, would eventually loom before persons and 
communities lacking a framework of such implicitly religious "final" 
meaning. 
Yet what if it were possible for persons to live in ways that are - at least 
apparently - humanly satisfying, but without a framework of definitive 
(Le. religious) meaning? Suppose that the human quest for meaning could 
be satisfied by a series of discrete, partial episodes of making sense which 
need not add up to a final, comprehensive framework - or suppose, even 
more radically, that one - or one's culture - came to accept that the quest 
for final meaning need not be satisfied at all. Suppose most people 
considered it not at all problematic to hold that life mostly consists - to 
use a colloquial expression - of "one damn thing after another" and that 
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few, if any, felt that there was any urgency to make of it anything more 
than that. 2 
Against the background of these seemingly speculative questions, this 
essay advances for discussion the hypothesis that a set of dynamics for 
living without a framework for final meaning is, in fact, already operative 
at a number of levels (theoretical, practical, popular) in the emerging 
cultures of informational, economic, and technological globalization. 
These dynamics are unlike those forms of nihilism and atheism that, 
because they presume the validity or the significance of a human quest for 
final meaning, are paradigmatically "modern" in their theoretical and 
practical articulations. Modern nihilism and atheism, like the forms of 
belief they contest, take final human meanings to adumbrate connections 
that are more than merely accidental and discontinuities that are not 
simply random. They are matter!i., enduringly inscribed in the human 
condition which mark out its depth - even if that depth consists only in 
the recognition of all meaning as a fragile human construct that is 
irrevocably shattered at one's death. 
In contrast, at least some of the dynamics present in emergent forms of 
so-called "postmodern" global culture work from a quite different 
presupposition: meaning is not and can never be final; it is only and 
always a matter of immediacy, contingency and "surface" - the 
connections that constitute meaning are merely transient " links that one 
just as easily clicks on as clicks off. Since every meaning is evanescent, any 
meaning will do. One need not regret abandoning one form of meaning 
for another, or for yet another after that. Meanings have only limited, 
contingent usefulness, and so are disposable once their usefulness for the 
moment has run its course. 
These dynamics, so the hypothesis runs, offer precisely the possibility 
of setting aside, without (much) regret, a quest for a life meaning that is 
unifying and comprehensive, while still finding life satisfaction precisely in 
whatever transient meaning can be constructed in and from the interrupted 
and interrupting interplay of life's particularity and contingency. This 
possibility is not altogether novel. A case can be made that this view was 
prefigured, in a much earlier age, by the Democritian atomism of 
Epicureanism, and that, more recently, David Hume eloquently proposed 
a similar view: an effective cure for the temptation to embark on a quest 
for final meaning - at least of the kind represented by metaphysical 
reasoning - is to find some pleasant social diversion that does not purport 
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to exhibit itself as something deeper. Such clear-headed recognition of the 
absence of final meaning need not lead - as it did for the existentialists of 
the middle third of the twentieth century - to defiance or despair in the 
face of a cosmos ultimately indifferent to the fate of any of its particular 
components. This recognition simply allows one to get on with making 
one's way through the partialities and contingencies of one's own life with 
an equanimity that comes from putting aside as pointless bother any quest 
for a deeper or final meaning in it. 
These dynamics can be appropriately called "the leveling of meaning." 
They arise, I believe, from the convergence of a variety of vectors upon the 
conditions of human living at the beginning of this new century. Some of 
these vectors take an economic form that seems driven by a momentum 
fueled by late twentieth-century global capitalism's dismantlement of its 
Marxist rival. In this context, the measure of "meaning" is economic loss 
and gain. As a function of market share, the bottom line, and the 
maximization of profit, this form of meaning has a far wider field than 
ever before over which to playas well as many more ways in which to play. 
Instantaneous transfer throughout a global network of markets has made 
it possible to catch, at anytime of day or night, just the right movement -
up or down - to better one's placement for yet more gain.3 
Other vectors take a technological form, driven by the exponentially 
growing possibilities for accessing and organizing information and for 
global communicative interconnection. In this context, even as meaning 
accrues in the assemblage of information and through the pathways of its 
transmission, it is potentially subject at each juncture of its path to 
re-assemblage and reconfiguration. Meaning arises as a function of coding 
and decoding, and power resides in mastery of the code.4 
Still other vectors take social and political forms that variously devolve 
governing power from the center into more localized bodies or demand 
due recognition of the practices that mark and sustain the particularity of 
linguistic, religious, or ethnic identity. Yet even as the forms of political 
power seem to be edging back to the local and particular, the shaping of 
the terms of the political discourse giving concrete meaning to the exercise 
of that power remain entrenched in dynamics that seem systemically to 
circumvent the possibility of accountability to any genuinely public realm, 
be it local, national, regional, or global. Political meaning - most notably, 
but not only, in electoral politics - comes to reside in how policy and 
personality can be packaged for this particular electorate at this particular 
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time. The temporal horizon for the endurance of political meaning 
stretches only as far as the next campaign. 
Embedded in these vectors (and others that I believe can be identified 
within the interplay of forces shaping our contemporary world) - so my 
hypothesis continues - is an implicit account of, if I may modify a phrase 
appropriated from Charles Taylor, "the making of a postmodern identity."s 
This account, which arises from the context of what Taylor has termed the 
"fractured horizons" of meaning that are the inheritance of modernity, 
poses a serious and perhaps even radically new challenge to religious belief 
and practice - most certainly to those forms that have arisen from the 
traditions that stretch back to Abraham but perhaps to all that construe 
our human identity, be it individual or collective, to be in some core sense 
"sp iri tual." 
The challenge that this account presents is not simply that it is a 
reductive naturalism, i.e. the view that there is no spiritual ingredient in 
what it takes to constitute an individual as (a) human (person). The 
challenge is, rather, that it is a naturalism so seamlessly woven into the 
fabric of daily practice that this absence of a spiritual component in our 
human make-up is unsurprising. It is taken as a matter of course that 
human life is solely a matter of contingent particularity that need not add 
up, individually or collectively, to all that much. Whereas "modern" 
challenges to religious belief and practice more typically.took form as an 
articulated theoretical denial or indignant protest (be it social or personal) 
in the face of claims made on behalf of transcendence, the "postmodern" 
challenge is far more likely to be, in practice, an expression of puzzlement 
or a shrug of indifference. 
This shrug is directed not so much at the content of the claims of 
belief, but at the very possibility that belief in God - or its denial - is a 
matter of importance in the business of negotiating one's way through 
life. As Taylor has succinctly put it, "The threat at the margin of modern 
non-theistic humanism is: So what?"6 The shrug of indifference, 
moreover, is no longer about what may be claimed about God; it is 
about what we may claim about our own humanity. If it is the case - and 
I think it is, though the point is arguable - that "modernity" has taught us 
that we can talk about ourselves and about the world without having to 
talk about God, then what "postmodernity" in some of its practical forms 
may be teaching us is to talk about ourselves without having to talk about 
ourselves as spirit. 
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I think it important for keeping discussion of my hypothesis on track 
that I point out that it is not principally concerned with the intellectual 
articulations that so-called "postmodernism" has given to matters such as 
particularity, contingency, interruptions and otherness. It is even less 
concerned with urging a program for a countervailing intellectual 
refutation of claims that are made in a postmodernist mode about these 
matters. I would, in fact, be willing to argue that such postmodernist 
articulations are particularly valuable precisely because they draw our 
attention to an emergent dynamic within our human circumstances which 
it would be perilous to ignore. 
My main concern in articulating this hypothesis is that we attend to 
how our imaginative and conceptual construal of what it is to be human is 
affected by practices that are woven into an emergent global culture and 
affect our daily lives. These practices, on the one hand, enable and 
encourage us to construe the content of our human satisfactions more 
and more in terms of the immediacy that arises from the interplay of 
contingent succession; yet, on the other hand, they also promise us the 
possibility of having increasing individual control over that interplay. They 
place us on the brink of beginning to believe that within our hands will 
soon be nothing less than the possibility of us each achieving our own 
individual "designer" satisfaction. 
I think that what is at issue here can be put in terms of a narrative that, 
even as it goes back to the formative period of Western philosophy, 
maintains considerable power as a diagnostic tool for our own 
circumstances: the myth of the cave told by Plato in the Republic. A 
contemporary retelling of this myth would, I believe, have to acknowledge 
that the shadows that play upon the wall of the cave have grown in the 
power they have to captivate human imagination. They have grown in 
power because we now seem to have gained a capacity to make them 
almost (shall I use the mantra "virtually"?) indistinguishable from that of 
which they are shadows. They have also grown in their power because we 
have willingly been enlisted in their making by the lure that we can make 
them whatever we want them to be. Unlike in Plato's version of the myth, 
we need not be chained before the shadow show to keep us engaged in it -
we readily stay in the cave, each taking our turn now as shadow-maker, 
now as shadow-watcher. There is no "outside" beyond the cave to make it 
manifest that the shadow show is no more than that. Insofar as we have 
come to believe that the shadow show is sufficient, that we need no 
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outside against which to measure it, such an "outside" has become quite 
unimaginable - and it is not even all that much of a bother to tune out the 
occasional noisy chatter of the few odd folks who claim there is. 
Perhaps this is all too harsh, especially in light of the fact that other 
vectors are at work within the dynamics fueling an emerging culture of 
globalization which make it possible for us to discern more fully the level 
of enduring human meaning that religious belief and practice have 
articulated as the locus for the presence and operation of spirit. At its best, 
the culture of globalization should make possible a more effective concrete 
recognition of our human interdependence and commonality, even as it 
allows greater room for expression and recognition of the particularity 
that makes each human being and set of human circumstances unique. It 
would be genuinely exhilarating to see processes of globalization 
deepening and enlarging the range for our discerning the presence of 
the spiritual at the core of human existence by making it possible for us to 
affirm both the enduring strength of our human connectedness and the 
uniqueness of the rich variety of our human differences. 
Yet it is also the case that the human knowledge and skills that make it 
possible for us to enlarge the complexity and the scope of our 
connectedness with one another have also made it possible for us to level 
our connectedness down to the linear simplicity of the discrete moments 
of transactional encounter and exchange in a marketplace that now is 
global. Our imaginative construal of the content of what connects us 
begins to be modelled on the means that now so easily enable us to make 
so many connections with one another: encoded packets of instantly 
transmittable information. Similarly, the knowledge and skills that make 
possible an articulation of difference as difference in ways that are 
potentially richer than any that were available in previous eras have also 
made it possible for us to level any difference down to the contingent 
coalescence of particularity that wins its meaning not as difference but as 
effective power against any other congeries of particularity that we 
perceive as posing a threat to our own particularity. 
This duality of possibilities suggests to me that in order to make actual 
those that a culture of globalization offers for enlarging the realm of spirit, 
we also need to identify and engage the perilous counter-possibilities of 
our seriously contracting it. It is important that we recognize the ways that 
we might very well become willing accomplices to the self-stifling of spirit, 
a possibility that Charles Taylor has aptly likened to performing "spiritual 
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lobotomy" upon ourselves? How might we prevent that from happening? 
At this point, I really do not know - and my own perplexity in the face 
of the possibility that we may be facing the emergence of a culture of 
unconcern is precisely what has moved me to propose the hypothesis 
of this chapter for discussion. 
If my hypothesis is correct, then an 'appropriate response on the part of 
communities of religious belief seems likely to require significant 
reshaping of both thought and practice in a variety of ways in order to 
address effectively the challenge presented by an environing culture that 
levels out all meaning. Just as I am quite sure that there is no one way, no 
single strategy that communities of religious believers can adopt to deal 
with these dynamics, I am equally sure that the wrong general strategy 
would be simply to seek some form of insulation from them - even though 
there may be circumstances in which creative strategies of protest and 
resistance may well be fitting. Far more appropriate, I believe, will be 
strategies that engage these dynamics in such a way as to enable them to 
become open from within to the possibility that the reality of spirit is so 
deeply embedded in the human that it simply cannot be stifled - no matter 
how hard we try. 
Let me therefore propose the outline of one strategy for discerning and 
engaging the reality of spirit within the larger cultural dynamics shaping us 
at the start of the twenty-first century. This strategy emerges from a 
resource upon which the three forms of the reflective appropriation of 
experience that have long shaped my work in philosophical and 
theological ethics have regularly converged: the capacity for exercising 
imagination as a critical power for the discernment of what is most deeply 
human.8 In proposing imagination as an appropriate resource for 
countering the leveling of meaning in which the practices of contemporary 
culture can make us complicit, I am understanding imagination as more 
than merely "fictive."9 Imagination is not the mere play of make-believe, a 
capacity for making up that which will never become actual. Imagination -
as it is exercised, for instance, in the oracles of the Hebrew prophets, in the 
parables of Jesus, or in nonviolent resistance to injustice as practiced by 
Martin Luther King, Jr. - is rather a capacity to make manifest the deepest 
inner possibilities that can be made actual as well as to unmask the 
illusions that constrain us from acting on those possibilities. lO 
In particular, the exercise of imagination that I think will be most 
needed throughout the century that has just begun is precisely that which 
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makes manifest to us that our own deepest inner possibilities as human are 
thoroughly spiritual. Imagination must be brought to bear to counter one 
of the losses that Charles Taylor thinks has taken place in forging the 
modern self - viz. an increasing inability to articulate our human identity 
as moral or spiritual in any but a private sense. Such a private construal of 
our identity as spirit almost inevitably proves too fragile to bear the weight 
of the quite public moral responsibility for one another in human 
solidarity, sympathy, and equality which, even in their naturalistic forms, 
our modern notions of the human self, agency, and experience have placed 
upon usY 
On the cusp between modernity and postmodernity, the task of 
imagination is also to unmask the ~usions that would keep us from 
acknowledging these inner possibilities. The postmodern has helped to 
unmask a core illusion embedded in the modern story: that it is within the 
reach of human power, and huma; power alone, be it through inwardness 
plumbed and expressed, or through attunement with nature, or through 
mastery over nature, to go beyond the conditions of our finitude. Yet, as 
Taylor argues, much that goes by the name "postmodern" is itself caught 
in the shadow of an illusion more subtle and far more dangerous, viz. that 
our finitude is all there is (to this I would add: and it is all the same.) What 
makes this illusion dangerous, on Taylor's account, is that it fatally 
undermines the possibility of acknowledging the full significance of our 
lives as human - an acknowledgment Taylor holds to be central to the self-
interpreting activity that is a key marker of our character as spirit.12 In the 
absence of that which stands beyond life, there cannot be an affirmation of 
life which is both sufficiently robust to acknowledge the plenitude of its 
goodness and sufficiently sober to recognize humbly that life is neither all 
that is nor all that matters. 13 
What direction, then, might imagination take to enable a new 
recognition of ourselves as spiritual, one that enables us to address the 
leveling of meaning? Taylor suggests that it lies in the fashioning of "new 
languages of personal resonance to make crucial human goods alive for us 
again."14 Although he notes the association that this notion of "personal 
resonance" has with the "expressive" strand of modernity, he distinguishes 
it carefully from the radical subjectivism into which much of both 
modernity and postmodernity have become fully enmeshed. The 
distinction is needed so that "languages of personal resonance" can 
effectively relate our human "life goods" to "constitutive goods" whose 
Rossi, THE LEVELING OF MEANING 169 
meaning and reality stand in being beyond the mere projection of 
immanent human strivings. In this I believe that Taylor seeks to set 
imagination off on the Augustinian path along which the movement 
"inward" of the self is drawn into a movement "outward" and "upward" 
and along which may be encountered the God who brings all such 
movement into being. 
This Augustinian echo suggests that the retrieval - or, indeed, 
reconstruction - of our selves as spirit/spiritual may be possible only by 
reference to what is encountered, recognized and respected as truly other 
as we move in the space that our valuings create. This Augustinian 
movement provides a theological context in which to read Taylor's 
otherwise enigmatic descriptions of what it means to be a self: "We are 
only selves insofar as we move in a certain space of questions, as we seek 
and find an orientation to the goOd."I5 On Taylor's account - in contrast to 
what has become both a typically modern and postmodern account - our 
activities of recognizing and bestowing significance and worth are not 
confined to a space entirely of immanent human making. 
On this account the most illusion-free ways of being a self - i.e. ways 
of valuing and being valued, of interpreting and being interpreted - thus 
involve recognition that value and meaning are not entirely ours to create. 
r think it is legitimate to read Taylor's account here as an Augustinian and 
Hegelian transformation of one of the most powerful postmodern 
themes: recognition of the other as the space in which meanings emerge can 
now also be seen as the space of spirit, i.e. the space in which otherness 
can welcome and can receive welcome. Taylor's rendering of this theme 
also has resonances of "grace," perhaps most clearly sounded in his 
characterization of the hope needed to chart our course in the wake of 
modernity, viz. the hope that is "a divine affirmation of the human, more 
total than humans can ever attain unaided."I6 
Taylor provides little explicit guidance for articulating what this hope 
means for the project of retrieving a notion of "spirit" by which to 
interpret our human lives and activities. The very suggestion of grace as 
the horizon of his project could, r suspect, be easily dismissed as a mere 
rhetorical flourish - but such a dismissal ' would be typically modern, for 
only moderns are likely to consider a rhetorical turn to be "mere." Both 
premoderns and postmoderns (as Taylor seems well aware) know better 
than to dismiss the rhetorical in this way. What direction, then, does 
Taylor expect us to chart for imagination from this echo of grace? How 
170 ETHICS AND RELIGION IN THE WEST 
does this horizon of grace as divine affirmation bear upon the possibility 
of interpreting ourselves constitutively as spirit? At this point I can offer 
only a suggestion that is as cryptic and as tentative as it is brief: spirit is the 
presence of others welcomed; spirit is presence to others welcoming; spirit 
is, first of all, being in the presence of the Other who welcomes all that is 
other. 
EPILOGUE: CHRISTIAN ETHICS, IMAGINATION, AND THE 
RECOVERY OF THE HUMAN AS SPIRIT 
If the diagnosis set forth in the main body of this chapter is correct, then 
the articulation of a Christian ethic for the twenty-first century needs to 
look critically and creatively at the resources available - both within 
Christian belief and practice and within the emergent globalized culture -
that will enable the re-envisioning-nf spirit as a constitutive element of the 
deepest part of our reality as human. The easier part of this task may be 
locating the imaginative resources that lie within the traditions of 
Christian belief and practice. One does not have to stand within the ambit 
of Christian faith to recognize the power that the narratives within Hebrew 
scripture, the parables of Jesus, or the lives of Francis of Assisi or Mother 
Teresa have to remind us - sometimes uncomfortably - that what is most 
deeply human within us (to use Taylor's image) is the "space" we clear (or 
constrict) for recognizing and acting on the orientation to the good, 
which, however flawed it may have become, remains firmly embedded 
within us. When, for instance, we hear or read the story (2 Samuel 
12:1-12) of how the prophet Nathan leads King David to recognize the 
enormity of the betrayal involved in his adulterous taking of Bathsheba, 
Uriah the Hittite's wife, a chord of self-recognition should strike in our 
own hearts - we are just as capable of moral self-deception as King David 
was and we are just as ready to condemn the other's conduct as we are to 
excuse like conduct of our own - until we are confronted by the humbling 
insight that we, too, are just as much the very "other" whom we were ready 
to shun and condemn. 
In this retrieval of the imaginative resources that lie within the 
traditions of Christian belief and practice, Christian ethics must not 
overlook the two-edged danger they also bear within them precisely in 
their power to shape our self-understanding. As feminist, African, Latino, 
African-American, and Asian theologians have vigorously, vividly, and 
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variously reminded those carried along by the mainstream of European 
and North American theology, uncritically appropriated images can 
distort theology's understanding of God, humanity, and the world and 
have misdirected - sometime disastrously - the practices of Christian 
communities. At the same time, awareness of the power that these 
resources have to disorient our movement toward what is good in the 
space of our valuings should not cause us to shrink from the other edge of 
their dangerous power. This is their capacity to surprise, subvert, and 
overturn even the most settled understandings we may have of ourselves 
and of the others we encounter in that space of our valuings. The story of 
the Syro-Phoenician woman (Mark 7:24-29) hints at how the insistent 
intrusion of the other - who turns inside out the image of "dog" that Jesus 
meant to rebuke and repel her - could be dangerously subversive even for 
Jesus in that it prods him to extend the horizon of his mission. 
More challenging for Christian ethics - and, I believe, more urgent -
will be the work of discerning the resources within the rapidly shifting 
kaleidoscope of the emerging globalized culture which will enable an 
appropriate re-envisioning of "spirit" as a constitutive element of the 
deepest part of our reality as human. To the extent that globalization is 
driven solely by a dynamic of the greater production and distribution of 
information, goods, and services to be consumed, the more likely we will 
be tempted to shape ourselves solely in the image of homo consumens. As 
one religious educator has noted, "Advertising, society's most potent 
educational force, teaches [our children] that their hunger for intimacy, 
security, success and meaning can be satisfied by conspicuous consumption. 
But if the deepest human needs can be met by owning and consuming 
products, what is left for religion to provide?"I7 Yet, if it is true, as I 
claimed above, that the reality of spirit is so deeply embedded in the 
human that it simply cannot be stifled, then even as we make ourselves 
complicit in the attempted leveling of all meaning to the surface play of 
contingencies, there remains something resistant within us that yearns for 
heights and depths of meaning commensurate with the best aspirations of 
our being. 
Some of this work has already started. For instance, Tom Beaudoin, in 
Virtual Faith: The Irreverent Spiritual Quest of Generation X,18 seeks to 
discern how a popular, technologized, and globalized culture has shaped 
authentic religious meanings for his "Generation X" cohort. Beaudoin's 
work suggests that it will be increasingly important in the twenty-first 
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century for Christian ethics to attend closely to the concrete and particular 
ways in which contemporary culture - perhaps even without conscious 
intent on the part of its makers - encourages or challenges individuals to 
enlarge their horizons of meaning. So even as a dynamic of the leveling of 
meaning plays itself out in contemporary culture, it may yet turn out to be 
a graced occasion for rediscovery of the more enduring truth of the 
resiliency of human spirit. 19 
NOTES 
1. This understanding of religion in terms of a human quest for meaning - or 
in terms of what Paul Tillich termed "ultimate concern" - does not require 
that the "final" meaning satisfying it be construed as that which is robustly 
"transcendent" of human reality, e.g. the God of the Abrahamic religions. 
It is thus an understanding o£ "religion" which is sweeping enough to 
encompass views and movements (such as Marxism or scientific 
naturalism) that even explicitly reject the doctrines and practices of those 
religions - or indeed of any formally religious tradition - insofar as this 
rejection is made in virtue of some alternative construal of what gives 
human activity and existence its definitive significance. 
2. The universality of such a quest for what I call "final meaning" has been 
recently affirmed in John Paul II's encyclical letter Fides et Ratio as a 
common basis out of which humanity's philosophical and religious 
dynamisms issue. To that extent, I believe that the encyclical continues 
primarily to engage philosophy in its "modern" guise. It does not fully 
articulate the radical challenge posed by the forms of postmodernity which 
theoretically or practically set aside the presuppositions that human beings 
(1) necessarily find themselves engaged in such a quest and (2) must 
eventually attain such final meaning to find life satisfaction. 
3. A point made - probably without conscious irony - in a recent television 
ad for an on-line securities trading service which is set in a meditation 
class: mantra-chanting students are asked to visualize themselves in 
soothing and tranquil circumstances. After one student evokes a seaside 
scene and another the forest, the third imagines himself at his computer 
making eight-dollar-per-trade transactions - a scene that immediately 
captures the imagination of the whole class, and the instructor as well, as 
truly relaxing. 
4. Meaning as coding can also be seen at work in the hopes that have been 
pinned on the successful completion of projects to map the human 
genome: knowledge of the code oflife will provide mastery to determine its 
future shape. The role of economic incentives in this project, moreover, is 
hardly peripheral: the U.S. Patent Office has been accepting applications 
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that would give to those who have deciphered segments of the genome 
rights over future use of those segments - for instance, in the case that they 
later provide a basis for new and effective medical therapies. 
5. Charles Taylor gives his magisterial work, Sources of the Self, the subtitle 
The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989). 
6. Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 317. 
7. Ibid., p. 520. 
8. These forms of "reflective appropriation of experience" are Catholic 
theology's understanding of grace as the freely given completion of all 
creation, Ignatius of Loyola's principle of "finding God in all things," and 
Immanuel Kant's recognition of hope as the critically founded focus for 
humanity's common moral endeavors. 
9. This point is more extensively treated in Philip J. Rossi, S.]., "Imagination 
and the Truth of Morality;' in Together Toward Hope: A Journey to Moral 
Theology (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 37-80. 
10. Iris Murdoch is one author who has extensively explored - both in her 
novels and in her philosophical essays - the power of imagination to bring 
us to make real that which is good. For a thoughtful appreciation of her 
work, see Charles Taylor, "Iris Murdoch and Moral Philosophy;' in Iris 
Murdoch and the Search for Human Goodness, ed. Maria Antonaccio and 
William Schweiker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 3-28. 
11. For Taylor's elaboration of this point, see Part IV of his Marianist Award 
Lecture, A Catholic Modernity?, ed. James 1. Heft (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), pp. 30-37. 
12. Taylor, Sources of the Self, pp. 341-343. 
13. I take this to be much ofthe burden of Taylor's argument in Part III of "Iris 
Murdoch and Moral Philosophy;' pp. 18-28. 
14. Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 513. 
15. Ibid., p. 34. Cf. Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 3: "[TJo be a full 
human agent, to be a person or self in the ordinary meaning, is to exist in a 
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